CVE-2026-62300
Reporte público de vulnerabilidad
BAJA Exploit público detectado CVSS 6.5 / MEDIUM CWE-400GTN Risk Score
Monitoreo
Score calculado con CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, evidencia pública de exploit y vector de ataque.
Resumen ejecutivo
Resumen ejecutivo
Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. In daemon deployments up to and including version 1.1.0, `POST /pins` in `src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts` checks a caller-supplied CID with `CID.parse` and passes it to `pinStore.pin`, but does not enforce request rate limits or per-user quotas. In `src/filecoin-pin-store.ts`, each pin independently schedules `_processPinInBackground` with `setTimeout` without a queue, semaphore or concurrency cap, then recursively traverses the full DAG using `helia.pins.add(cid)`. The per-pin Helia/Bitswap node in `src/create-pinning-helia.ts` has no application-level byte, block or traversal-time limits. Blocks are written under `carStoragePath` by `src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts` and `src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts`, with `stats.totalSize` updated only after writing. An authenticated caller, or an anonymous caller when `ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true`, can submit large DAGs and exhaust disk, network, CPU, memory and libp2p resources, causing service degradation or host/process failure and leaving partial CAR files requiring recovery. The default localhost binding and token requirement reduce exposure. Because nodes have no bootstrap or mDNS configuration, a CID alone may not be fetchable, but caller-supplied `origins` can point to a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p source; concurrent requests accelerate resource pressure. Version 1.1.1 documents operational mitigations but does not implement the missing resource controls. Resumen de riesgo: CVE-2026-62300 presenta CVSS 6.5, severidad MEDIA, EPSS 0.25%, CISA KEV: No, exploit público detectado: Sí. Producto/proveedor asociado: No disponible / No disponible. Se recomienda validar exposición, revisar versiones afectadas, aplicar parche o mitigación disponible y monitorear actividad relacionada.
Indicadores
¿De qué se trata?
Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. In daemon deployments up to and including version 1.1.0, `POST /pins` in `src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts` checks a caller-supplied CID with `CID.parse` and passes it to `pinStore.pin`, but does not enforce request rate limits or per-user quotas. In `src/filecoin-pin-store.ts`, each pin independently schedules `_processPinInBackground` with `setTimeout` without a queue, semaphore or concurrency cap, then recursively traverses the full DAG using `helia.pins.add(cid)`. The per-pin Helia/Bitswap node in `src/create-pinning-helia.ts` has no application-level byte, block or traversal-time limits. Blocks are written under `carStoragePath` by `src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts` and `src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts`, with `stats.totalSize` updated only after writing. An authenticated caller, or an anonymous caller when `ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true`, can submit large DAGs and exhaust disk, network, CPU, memory and libp2p resources, causing service degradation or host/process failure and leaving partial CAR files requiring recovery. The default localhost binding and token requirement reduce exposure. Because nodes have no bootstrap or mDNS configuration, a CID alone may not be fetchable, but caller-supplied `origins` can point to a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p source; concurrent requests accelerate resource pressure. Version 1.1.1 documents operational mitigations but does not implement the missing resource controls.
Producto / proveedor
Fechas
Estado de explotación
Evidencia encontrada
| Fuente | Estado | Detalle | Confianza |
|---|---|---|---|
| NVD References | Referencia sospechosa/PoC | NVD contiene una referencia relacionada con PoC, exploit o repositorio público. | Media |
| NVD References | Referencia sospechosa/PoC | NVD contiene una referencia relacionada con PoC, exploit o repositorio público. | Media |
Nota: esta sección es referencial y defensiva. La ausencia de evidencia pública no garantiza que no exista explotación privada o no publicada.
¿Cómo superarlo / mitigarlo?
- Mantener monitoreo. La probabilidad actual de explotación es baja según EPSS.
- Vector de red: revisar exposición pública, reglas de firewall, WAF/VPN y segmentación.