CVE-2026-116244
Reporte público de vulnerabilidad
BAJA Exploit público detectado CVSS 8.2 / HIGH CWE-522GTN Risk Score
Prioridad media
Score calculado con CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, evidencia pública de exploit y vector de ataque.
Resumen ejecutivo
Resumen ejecutivo
When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential cache while that user was connecting. The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. Resumen de riesgo: CVE-2026-116244 presenta CVSS 8.2, severidad ALTA, EPSS 0.28%, CISA KEV: No, exploit público detectado: Sí. Producto/proveedor asociado: No disponible / No disponible. Se recomienda validar exposición, revisar versiones afectadas, aplicar parche o mitigación disponible y monitorear actividad relacionada.
Indicadores
¿De qué se trata?
When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential cache while that user was connecting. The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
Producto / proveedor
Fechas
Estado de explotación
Evidencia encontrada
| Fuente | Estado | Detalle | Confianza |
|---|---|---|---|
| NVD References | Referencia sospechosa/PoC | NVD contiene una referencia relacionada con PoC, exploit o repositorio público. | Media |
| NVD References | Referencia sospechosa/PoC | NVD contiene una referencia relacionada con PoC, exploit o repositorio público. | Media |
Nota: esta sección es referencial y defensiva. La ausencia de evidencia pública no garantiza que no exista explotación privada o no publicada.
¿Cómo superarlo / mitigarlo?
- Mantener monitoreo. La probabilidad actual de explotación es baja según EPSS.
- CVSS alto: evaluar impacto en servicios relevantes.
- Vector de red: revisar exposición pública, reglas de firewall, WAF/VPN y segmentación.